One of Stock Lending Today's avid readers passed on an article written by Christopher Holt of AllAboutAlpha.com entitled "Securities Lending starting to dry up a little?"
Mr. Holt brings together a number of strands quite nicely in his article, and I wanted to expand on these points a little bit further. I suggest you take a few minutes and read it, as I am making additional points and comments based on his article rather than starting this post from scratch.
He looks at a number of issues in securities lending at the moment: Supply/demand, the Watson report and cash reinvestments. I have taken a number of the comments made by the contributing reader and added some of my own. Probably all the good comments are his and the ones you disagree with are mine.
In addition to the points raised, demand has also been impacted by a few other factors. Hedge funds have been closing out both long and short positions for some time in order to fund redemptions. As well as hedge funds, investment bank prop traders have been loathe to take on new positions and have been in "December lock-down" for some time now. For many, 2008 was a write-off and they have not been keen on risking further losses, rather they are holding fire until we get into 2009. I also continue with my assertion that as stock market prices continue to drop, the risk reward scenario for a directional short changes and becomes less attractive.
Regarding the reduction of supply, I have questions about the “quality” of the assets that have been pulled from lending programs by institutions. I have yet to hear too many lamentations about the disappearance of liquid, widely available “general collateral” assets from the global lending pool. Inevitably there has been a diminution of some assets that are in demand and can’t easily be replaced, but by and large the stocks that have gone have been substituted without too much concern.
The Watson Wyatt report? Don't get me started. Refer to my previous blog on the subject instead.
The Pensions & Investments article referred to quotes a corporate pension fund executive as saying he was surprised at how much long dated paper was held in the collateral pool for his loans. Surely people check their investments from time to time and cash collateral re-investment should have been the same.
In any case, as the reader points out:
“This for many will no doubt be a contentious view point but ABS and MBS were seen as good investments for many years and by the size of the market issuance this view was held by others not just Securities Lenders. Risk managers and investment professionals believed they were appropriate investments as did rating agencies who rated them AAA.”
Time will tell just how many of these investments actually default. Until then, the real losers will be the ones who bought at previous “normal” market prices and have been forced to crystallise losses that are simply a result of selling distressed assets in an illiquid market. The real winners will be those who do the buying and can fund them until maturity.
Chris makes reference to the joint statement issued by ISLA and other lending associations in September. The letter from the various lending institutions came at a time of significant stress in the markets stemming from the Lehman default. Indeed, there were several well-publicised withdrawals from lending in whole or in part by a number of institutions. However, this has levelled off recently and I believe that the joint statement was an important and valuable move in stemming the tide.
Chris suggests an almost inevitable increase in the cost of borrowing stock, Given that the need to maintain liquidity in cash reinvestment pools is currently skewing lending fees, it is difficult to necessarily come to the conclusion that the reduction in supply will result in higher intrinsic fees charged to borrowers. We all watch this point with interest.
However, as Mr. Holt points out oh-so-accurately there is an awful lot of peddling going on under the waterline to keep the motion of the securities lending business going. The only disagreement I have with him is that I prefer to think of securities lending as a swan, rather than a duck.
P.S. Thanks to the contributor of the article!